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Coronavirus (CoV) represents a large family of viruses that affect the 
respiratory system. Some examples of these viruses are Middle East 
respiratory syndrome (MERS-CoV) and severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS-CoV). In December 2019, seemingly unexplain-
able respiratory infections suddenly arose in Wuhan, China. On 
11 February 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) classified 
the disease caused by the novel CoV as COVID-19.[1]
Realising the serious public health risks posed by the novel CoV, 
the WHO declared COVID-19 a pandemic on 11 March 2020. 
Shortly afterwards, on 15 March 2020, the President of South 
Africa (SA), Cyril Ramaphosa, declared a national State of Disaster 
in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Consequently, the SA 
government implemented several interventions to minimise the 
risk of COVID-19 transmission among the public, including school 
closures, foreign travel bans, and bans on social gatherings of over 
100 people.[2] As COVID-19 continued its spread throughout SA, 
President Ramaphosa announced a 21-day nation-wide lockdown 
starting at 00h00 on 27 March 2020. At this point, the public was 
permitted only to leave their homes to seek medical care, buy food 
or collect a social grant. The lockdown also included the closure 
of all stores and businesses except for essential services (such as 
pharmacies, laboratories, banks, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 
supermarkets, petrol stations and healthcare providers), as well as 
the halt of non-essential transport services.[3,4]
The goal of these interventions was to limit viral transmission by 
limiting the risk of exposure to infected persons.[5,6] Limiting such 
risk may be difficult for members of the public who rely on the 
use of public ground transport during the pandemic. During the 
lockdown in SA, buses and minibus taxis continued to transport 
essential service workers and members of the public doing the 
aforementioned permitted activities.[4] The continued use of public 
ground transport poses a risk of viral transmission because countless 
numbers of people are put in close proximity to one another. The 
belief that public transport may pose a risk for increasing viral 
transmission is based on high occupant density, overcrowding 
in an enclosed space, inadequate ventilation, recirculation of 
contaminated air, and increased duration of exposure to infected 
individuals.[7,8]
As COVID-19 can be transmitted through droplets produced by 
coughing or sneezing, the general public and healthcare providers 
have taken to using facemasks, particularly N95 respirators, in the 
hope of reducing the risk of infection. The supply of N95 respirators 
has therefore run low, necessitating the limited and optimised use 
of these masks.[9] These low supplies have caused panic among the 
general public and healthcare providers alike. However, a study 
by Loeb et al.[10] has shown that N95 respirators may not confer 
additional protection against influenza infection compared with 
the use of a surgical mask, suggesting that the panic surrounding 
the shortage of N95 respirators may not be warranted. Loeb et al.[10] 
stressed the importance of assessing the true value of endorsing and 
implementing interventions. Consequently, the present review had 
two objectives: (i) to better understand the role of public ground 
transport in COVID-19 transmission; and (ii) to assess interventions 
that may reduce the transmission of COVID-19 infections in public 
ground transport. Empirical evidence should be the basis on which 
recommendations are made with regard to how best to deal with 
the pandemic. We therefore performed a rapid review of the current 
literature in order to assess the abilities of different interventions to 
decrease the incidence of droplet-based infections among people 
using public ground transport.
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In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous countries worldwide declared national states of emergency and implemented 
interventions to minimise the risk of transmission among the public. Evidence was needed to inform strategies for limiting COVID-
19 transmission on public transport. On 20 March 2020, we searched MEDLINE, CENTRAL, Web of Science and the World Health 
Organization’s database of ‘Global research on coronavirus disease (COVID-19)’ to conduct a rapid review on interventions that reduce viral 
transmission on public ground transport. After screening 74 records, we identified 4 eligible studies. These studies suggest an increased risk 
of viral transmission with public transportation use that may be reduced with improved ventilation. International and national guidelines 
suggest the following strategies: keep the public informed, stay at home when sick, and minimise public transport use. Where use is 
unavoidable, environmental control, respiratory etiquette and hand hygiene are recommended, while a risk-based approach needs to guide 
the use of non-medical masks.
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Methods
Rapid reviews aim to provide a summary of the evidence in a short 
space of time.[11] The participants of interest were humans using 
public transportation (taxis, buses, trains and subways) and exposed 
to viruses such as influenza, SARS-CoV or MERS-CoV. The study 
designs that aligned best with our goals involved the inclusion 
of systematic reviews, clinical trials (including but not limited to 
randomised controlled trials), comparative observational studies and 
modelling studies. We included only studies published between 2000 
and 2020 in English to maintain relevance to modern society. We 
excluded studies where the participants/context of the intervention 
were healthcare workers in healthcare facilities, owing to the high 
possibility of confounding variables presented by their work. This 
review was concerned with investigating interventions such as the 
use of personal protective equipment, hand hygiene, social distancing 
and surface sanitisation and their relationship to the incidence of 
infections.
Identifying studies for inclusion
On 20 March 2020, we searched MEDLINE (PubMed), CENTRAL 
(Cochrane Library) and Web of Science (Clarivate Analytics) to 
identify studies or systematic reviews that were relevant to our 
research question. Studies were not excluded based on geographical 
location or type of public ground transport. The search strategy 
can be found in Fig. 1 (accessible at http://www.samj.org.za/public/
sup/14751.docx). In addition, we screened reference lists of relevant 
reviews in order to identify any additional relevant studies, and 
searched the WHO’s database ‘Global research on coronavirus disease 
(COVID-19)’.[12]
Making use of reference management software (Endnote), one 
researcher screened through all 74 records (titles and abstracts) 
identified by the search and excluded all obviously ineligible 
records. Seven records remained potentially eligible, and two other 
researchers then screened through these and identified four relevant 
studies/reviews that met this rapid review’s eligibility criteria. The 
three records not meeting the eligibility criteria were not specific 
to interventions.  For each of the included records, we thoroughly 
analysed the full text manuscripts.
Data extraction
Each included study/review was extracted by one researcher. The 
following data were extracted:  publication details (year, author(s)), 
location, method of transport, virus, details of the interventions and 
comparisons, diagnostic tests, number of infected persons, number 
of tested contacts, transmission rate, and number of cases with active 
disease. We examined other factors that may affect the transmission 
of viral diseases such as travel time and environmental factors 
(ventilation and air conditioning systems, seating position, distance 
to contact person).
Results
We identified one systematic review, two modelling studies and one 
case-control study (Table 1).
Systematic review
The systematic review by Browne et al. (2016)[13] estimated the risk 
of transmission related to the use of transport systems. The search 
was done in June 2014, and the authors found 41 studies. For our 
review, we did not consider studies that were already included in 
the systematic review separately. The majority of studies investigated 
transmission related to air transport (n=30), while 6 studies were 
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undertaken across Europe (UK, Germany and Spain), Asia (China, 
Korea, Japan and Singapore), North America (USA and Canada) and 
Australasia (New Zealand and Australia). Twenty-nine studies were on 
influenza, 5 were on SARS-CoV and 2 were on MERS-CoV. Three did 
not specify the virus transmitted, and 2 were on both influenza and 
SARS-CoV. In this systematic review, 4 quantitative studies discussed 
the risk for viral transmission on ground transport. A study by Piso 
et al. (2011)[14] did contact tracing of one H1N1 influenza-infected 
individual who undertook a long-distance bus journey, and identified 
a laboratory-confirmed secondary case 3 days later. Pestre et al. 
(2012)[15] investigated the spread of H1N1 influenza among a group 
of 24 individuals travelling together, and showed that 84% of a group 
travelling together contracted the virus. Their study also suggested that 
rail transport was important in accelerating the spread of influenza 
to new areas in the 1918  influenza A (H1N1) pandemic.[15] Cui et al. 
(2011)[16] described a study involving 2 555 passengers on a train with 
2 H1N1-positive individuals. This study demonstrated that risk of 
transmission was associated with seating proximity to the index case 
and duration spent aboard, and that there was transmission to persons 
in previously unaffected destinations from arriving rail passengers. [16] 
A case-control study by Troko et al. (2011)[17] followed 72 cases of 
individuals with acute respiratory infections and compared them with 
66 controls. After adjusting for confounders, persons reporting to the 
general practitioner with acute respiratory infection were almost six 
times as likely to have used public transport during the previous 5 days 
than controls (odds ratio (OR) 5.94; p<0.05).
Case-control study
Researchers in Spain (Castilla et al., 2013[18]) did a multi-centre case-
control study in which they evaluated the effect of various factors or 
situations that could lead to an increased risk of infection, including 
the use of public transport. From 36 medical facilities, 481 adult 
outpatients with laboratory-confirmed influenza A (H1N1/09) in the 
2009 - 2010 season were the cases. Community-based controls were 
used, matched to cases by age, area and consultation date. Medical 
records were thoroughly reviewed, interviews were conducted with 
participants, and information on risk situations was collected. 
Specifically, information on the use of metropolitan public transport 
(bus, metro, tram or local train), long-distance transport (train or 
plane), and having taken a taxi during the 7 days before the onset 
of symptoms in cases or the medical consultation in controls was 
collected. In spite of matching, cases were slightly younger than 
controls and more often had secondary or higher education, were 
pregnant women, or had more than one major risk condition. The 
use of various modes of public transport (specifically metro, bus, 
tram or local train) showed a lower probability of being diagnosed 
with influenza (OR 0.45; 95% confidence interval (CI) 0.30 - 0.68). 
Meanwhile, travelling by train (typically longer distances), aeroplane 
(OR 0.80; 95% CI 0.50 - 1.28), or taxi (OR 1.19; 95% CI 0.70 - 2.04) 
did not show an association with influenza diagnosis. This study has 
a moderate risk of bias, which means that there are some concerns 
about the robustness of the methods. Furthermore, it is important 
to note that the public transport context in which this study took 
place may differ from those elsewhere. Differences between countries 
may include types of ventilation systems, rider density, seating 
arrangements, and time spent in the vehicle. Decision-makers 
worldwide need to consider the applicability of public transport 
studies carefully.
Modelling studies
Furuya (2007)[19] published a modelling study that used a model based 
on the Wells-Riley equation to quantify the risk associated with the 
inhalation of indoor airborne infection on trains. The output of this 
risk equation was the probability of infection for susceptible people 
in an enclosed environment. This probability could then be used to 
calculate the estimated reproduction number (Ra), where a higher 
Ra indicates a greater risk of disease transmission. In using this risk 
equation to estimate the influence of interventions on risk reduction, 
it was shown that use of a facemask and improved ventilation of 
a railway carriage could reduce risk of disease transmission. They 
found that a crowded train may increase the eventual number of 
infections by 2 - 3 times and cause an earlier peak of the epidemic 
curve by 30 days. The model demonstrated that if healthy passengers 
wore a surgical mask, the median of distribution for Ra decreased 
from 2.22 to 2.08, while use of high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) 
masks showed a decrease to 1.13. However, doubling the rate of 
ventilation reduced the median of distribution for Ra to 1.17, which 
is a cost-effective intervention. The author suggests that, while they 
may be effective at reducing infection risk, HEPA masks may not 
be available to all passengers, and improved ventilation of railway 
carriages may be a more effective and feasible intervention.
Zhu et al. (2012)[20] used a computational fluid dynamics-based 
numerical model integrated within a Wells-Riley equation. They 
used this to numerically assess the risk of airborne transmission of 
influenza in buses. They modelled three very common ventilation 
methods used in buses, where the location of the air supply and air 
exhaust openings were varied. They also modelled an air-recirculation 
mode that included a high-efficiency filter and compared it with 
complete (100%) ventilation, termed non-air-recirculation modes. 
They found that in the common ventilation methods, the location 
of the infected person in combination with the location of the air 
supply/exhaust openings was important, i.e. the passengers located 
between the infected passenger and the air exhaust had a higher 
risk of infection. The probability of infection varied from 0.05% to 
10.1% for seated passengers and up to 27.2% for standing passengers, 
depending on location and ventilation mode. For displacement 
ventilation (air supply near the ground and air exhaust at the top 
of the bus), the probability of infection remained at 0.05% despite 
changes in location. Furthermore, when the ventilation system 
was operated with the parameters 25% air recirculation and 75% 
efficiency filtration system, the probability of infection increased 
by only 0.05% compared with complete ventilation, regardless of 
ventilation method/passenger locations. However, since recirculation 
is beneficial for thermal comfort, a filtration system or displacement 
ventilation may be beneficial.
Discussion
The SA government has implemented several measures to keep 
members of the public away from each other in order to minimise 
the risk of COVID-19 transmission.[2,3] However, there are instances 
where being in close proximity may be unavoidable, such as when 
people use buses and minibus taxis which are available for necessary 
commutes, even during the nation-wide lockdown.[3,4] Since COVID-
19 spreads from person to person through the respiratory droplets 
produced when an infected person coughs or sneezes, and from 
touching contaminated surfaces, the use of public transport may 
contribute to the transmission of COVID-19 by bringing people 
together in high densities. The goal of this rapid review was to 
investigate the evidence surrounding interventions that may decrease 
the risk of viral transmission while using public ground transport.
Few empirical research studies have explored the effectiveness of 
risk reduction strategies in this context. Only two modelling studies 
were found. One study demonstrated that crowded trains can increase 
the number of infections by 2 - 3 times and cause an earlier peak of 
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the epidemic curve by 30 days. This same study showed that the use 
of facemasks and ventilation on trains can reduce the risk of airborne 
infection.[19] The other modelling study demonstrated that filtration 
of recirculated air may decrease the risk of viral transmission if non-
recirculated air cannot be provided, and that, in the case of common 
ventilation methods on public transport, the probability of passengers 
contracting a viral respiratory infection from an infected passenger is 
decreased when the infected person is situated closer to the exhaust 
opening.[20] The systematic review included in our review found that 
use of public transport increased the risk of influenza transmission.[13] 
In particular, a study included in the systematic review showed that 
the risk of transmission aboard a train was associated with seating 
proximity to the index case and duration of time spent aboard.[16] 
Also included in the systematic review, a case-control study showed 
that the use of public transportation during the 5 days prior to 
symptom onset was associated with a significantly higher frequency 
of influenza A (H1N1/09), while another study suggested that rail 
transport was important in accelerating the spread of influenza to 
new areas in the 1918 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic.[13,15,17]
In contrast to the above findings, we identified a case-control 
study conducted in Spain which demonstrated that the use of 
public transport 7 days prior to the onset of respiratory symptoms 
was associated with a normal or lower probability of a diagnosis of 
influenza.[18] The authors suggest that this finding may be due to the 
development of protective antibodies in public transport users as a 
result of previous exposures to influenza virus during their commute. 
However, these results should be viewed with caution owing to the 
limitations of the study linked to case and control selection, recall 
bias and confounding factors. Potential confounding factors may 
include the possibility that people with influenza are less likely to 
travel using public transport, and the implicit bias that case-control 
studies bring when implying reverse causation. Furthermore, the 
cases in the study were individuals who presented to their doctor with 
influenza. People who rely solely on public transport may have more 
difficulty accessing and consulting with their physician. Also, while 
the study adjusted for age during comparisons, it did not adjust for 
confounding factors such as diet and exercise. Overall, these factors 
contribute to decreasing the quality of the evidence.
It is important to note that the studies included in this review 
are based mainly on influenza and/or non-COVID-19 CoVs. These 
viruses have different characteristics from those of COVID-19 and 
may need to be handled differently. The WHO has described key 
differences between influenza viruses and COVID-19. Important 
factors to note are that influenza has a shorter incubation period, 
shorter serial interval, lower reproductive number and lower 
mortality rate than COVID-19.[21] Together, these factors suggest 
that COVID-19 is more contagious and potentially more dangerous 
than influenza. A limitation of this review is therefore that we 
cannot be confident that studies involving influenza can accurately 
inform guidelines about COVID-19 owing to the novelty of this 
new CoV.
Given the limited scientific evidence on the topic, we examined 
international and national guidance documents that recommend 
public education and the adoption of various strategies (Table 2).
In Canada, the Public Health Agency of Canada in collaboration 
with Canadian public health experts developed guidance for federal, 
provincial or territorial public health authorities on the use of public 
health measures to reduce and delay transmission of COVID-19 in 
the community.[22] The European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control guidelines for the use of non-pharmaceutical measures to 
delay and mitigate the impact of 2019-nCoV was based on knowledge 
of 2019-nCoV and evidence available on other viral respiratory 
pathogens – SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV and seasonal or pandemic 
influenza viruses.[23] Public Health England provides guidance for 
staff in the transport sector in order to reduce risk of COVID-19 
transmission.[24] Additionally, the National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine has produced a guide to aid in public 
transportation pandemic planning and response with a chapter 
dedicated to the prevention of the spread of disease associated with 
use of public transport.[25] The WHO ‘Infection prevention and control 
of epidemic- and pandemic-prone acute respiratory infections in 
health care’ guidelines provide recommendations, best practices and 
principles for non-pharmacological aspects of infection prevention 
and control for acute respiratory infections in healthcare, with special 
emphasis on those that can present as epidemics or pandemics.[26] As 
the wide use of masks by healthy people in the community setting 
is not supported by current evidence and carries uncertainties, the 
WHO advises that decision-makers apply a risk-based approach 
taking into account a number of factors: the purpose of mask use; 
risk of exposure to COVID-19 in the local setting; vulnerability 
of the person to develop severe disease; the setting in which the 
population lives in terms of population density, ability to carry out 
physical distancing, and risk of rapid spread; and feasibility and type 
of mask (with medical masks reserved for healthcare workers).[27] 
In SA, the National Institute for Communicable Diseases produced 
an environmental health guideline to supplement the guideline on 
case finding, diagnosis, management and public health response to 
COVID-19.[28] The recommendations from these guidelines are set 
out in Table 3. The box on the same page provides a summary of the 
key findings from the current review.
Table 2. Summary of the included guidance documents
Guidance Year 
Public Health Agency of Canada[22] Community-based measures to mitigate the spread of coronavirus 
disease (COVID-19) in Canada
2020
ECDC Technical Report[23] Guidelines for the use of non-pharmaceutical measures to delay and 
mitigate the impact of 2019-nCoV 
2020
Public Health England[24] Transport guidance 2020
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and 
Medicine[25]
A guide for public transportation pandemic planning and response 2014
WHO[26] Infection prevention and control of epidemic- and pandemic-prone 
acute respiratory infections in health care
2014
WHO[27] Advice on the use of masks in the context of COVID-19 2020
NICD[28] COVID-19 environmental health guidelines 2020
ECDC = European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control; WHO = World Health Organization; NICD = National Institute for Communicable Diseases.
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Conclusions
Findings from this review suggest that the use of public transport 
increases the risk of viral transmission owing to the correlation 
between recent use of public transport and presentation of influenza 
symptoms, and that risk of transmission increases with an increase 
in trip duration and proximity to an infected individual. The review 
also identified two modelling studies suggesting that adequate 
ventilation could reduce the probability of passengers contracting a 
viral respiratory infection from an infected passenger.
Ultimately, there is limited empirical evidence surrounding risk 
reduction interventions to be used on public ground transport in 
order to slow the transmission of COVID-19. However, national 
and international guidelines have suggested that limiting the use 
of public transport, environmental control, respiratory etiquette, 
hand hygiene, and active communication and information sharing 
by public health are conducive to limiting transmission. Overall, 
further investigations surrounding the efficacy and plausibility of 
various interventions involving public transportation may provide 
key information in limiting the spread of COVID-19.
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Table 3. Recommendations from the included guidance documents
Minimise use of public transport
If ill, socially isolate yourself
Where using public transport is unavoidable:
• Environmental control: use surface cleaning, avoid touching handrails and doorknobs and touching face, and ensure adequate ventilation
• Respiratory etiquette: when coughing and sneezing cover mouth and nose with flexed elbow or tissue, and dispose the tissue in a bin
• Hand hygiene: hand washing or use of hand sanitisers, if water and soap not available, before and after using public transport
• Masks: wear a mask (as physical distancing is not possible) – medical masks should be reserved for healthcare workers
Actively communicate and share information to ensure that the public is informed
Summary of the key findings and recommendations
COVID-19 spreads from person to person through respiratory droplets produced when an infected person coughs or sneezes, and from touching 
contaminated surfaces. The World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic on 11 March 2020, and in South Africa President 
Ramaphosa announced that the COVID-19 outbreak had been declared a national State of Disaster in terms of the Disaster Management Act.
Risk of transmission of respiratory viral infections in public transport
A barrier to achieving social distancing is the widespread use of public ground transit such as buses, taxis, and trains. Large numbers of people are 
in close proximity to each other, often in overcrowded conveyances. The risk of transmission is associated with:
• seating proximity to an index case
• duration of time spent aboard
• inadequate ventilation and the consequential recirculation of contaminated air.
Reducing risk of transmission of respiratory viral infections in public transport
This rapid review of the current research evidence (up to date on 20 March 2020) on interventions for reducing the risk of viral infection while 
using public ground transport, included four studies (one systematic review, one case-control study and two modelling studies). It found that:
• The use of public transportation during the 7 days prior to symptom onset was associated with a significantly higher frequency of influenza A 
(H1N1/09).
• Rail transport was important in accelerating the spread of influenza to new areas in the 1918 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic, and transmission 
to persons in previously unaffected destinations from arriving rail passengers was observed in China during the influenza A (H1N1)pdm09 
pandemic.
• From modelling studies, filtering air being circulated within the bus can reduce airborne transmission of influenza between passengers, and 
improving ventilation on a train can decrease the risk of influenza infection.
Recommendations for risk reduction strategies from international and national guidance
• Minimise the use of public transport.
• If sick, stay at home.
• Where using public transport is unavoidable:
• Environmental control: surface cleaning, avoid touching handrails, doorknobs and touching face, and ensure adequate ventilation.
• Respiratory etiquette: when coughing and sneezing, cover mouth and nose with flexed elbow or tissue, and dispose of the tissue in a bin.
• Hand hygiene: hand washing or use of hand sanitisers, if water and soap not available, before and after using public transport.
• Masks: wear a mask (as physical distancing is not possible). Medical masks should be reserved for healthcare workers.
• Actively communicate and share information to ensure that the public is informed.
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